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Abstract 
 
A tremendous amount of individual-level data is generated each day, of use to marketing, decision makers, and 
machine learning applications. This data often contain private and sensitive information about individuals, which can 
be disclosed by “adversaries”. An adversary can recognize the underlying individual's identity for a data record by 
looking at the values of quasi-identifier (QID) attributes, known as identity disclosure, or can uncover sensitive 
information about an individual through attribute disclosure. In Statistical Disclosure Control, multiple disclosure risk 
measures have been proposed. These share two drawbacks: they do not consider identity and attribute disclosure 
concurrently in the risk measure, and they make restrictive assumptions on an adversary's knowledge by assuming 
certain attributes are QIDs and there is a clear boundary between QIDs and sensitive information. In this paper, we 
present a novel disclosure risk measure that addresses these limitations, by presenting a single combined metric of 
identity and attribute disclosure risk, and providing flexibility in modeling adversary’s knowledge. We have developed 
an efficient algorithm for computing the proposed risk measure and evaluated the feasibility and performance of our 
approach on a real-world dataset from the domain of social work. 
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1. Introduction and Background 
Individual-level data (aka microdata) is of interest to researchers and decision makers in many domains, for tracking, 
classifying, and predicting people’s behavior. However, it often contains private and sensitive information about 
individuals, such as Electronic Health Records, and thereby cannot be made freely available for public access. Thus, 
the question is how data owners can share their data for research purposes while not violating individuals’ privacy. 
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) and Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) are two areas in privacy field 
that have recently studied this problem in depth. 
  
For privacy preservation, direct identifiers that are unique to a person, such as social security number and phone 
number, are removed from the microdata. However, de-identification is not guaranteed because of the existence of 
quasi-identifiers (QIDs). QIDs are attributes, which are not individually unique to a person, but when considered as a 
set the combination of QID field values can be used to identify individuals with high probability. Examples are 
birthdate, gender, and zip code. Another class of attributes in microdata are Sensitive Attributes (SA), which contain 
sensitive information about individuals such as those relating to health, education, criminal history, or income.   
 
An “adversary” is a person who wants to disclose sensitive information about a person, called the “victim”. The 
adversary typically knowns the values of the QIDs of the victim from personal knowledge or publicly available 
datasets (local census data, voter lists, social media, …), and uses this information to match against QIDs appearing 
in the confidential dataset. For example Sweeney [1] demonstrated discovering the medical record of the governor of 
Massachusetts from data released by the Group Insurance Commission, after obtaining the QID-values for the 
Governor from a public voter registration list. Sweeney notes that 87% of U.S. citizens can be uniquely recognized in 
datasets using only their birth date, gender, and 5-digit zip code. Although QIDs might lead to disclosure, they 
generally cannot be removed from the dataset since they carry useful information for research and analysis purposes. 
   
Two main disclosure types that have been studied in depth in the literature are Identity Disclosure and Attribute 
Disclosure. Identity Disclosure occurs when an adversary can recognize that a record in the released dataset belongs 
to an individual by matching QID values. Attribute Disclosure occurs when an adversary can link a sensitive value to 
an individual. In the latter, the adversary may not precisely identify a record of a specific victim, but could infer his/her 
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sensitive values from the published data, based on the set of sensitive values associated with the group that the victim 
belongs to.  
 
Previous studies in SDC have proposed techniques to measure the risk of identity disclosure. These risk measures are 
defined based on either uniqueness or re-identification. In uniqueness measures, risk is defined as the probability that 
the rare combination of QID values in the privacy preserved dataset is indeed rare in the population dataset [2].  Re-
identification methods estimate the number of re-identifications an adversary can obtain by matching QIDs from his 
external knowledge against confidential dataset through record linkage algorithms [3, 4]. These methods require the 
assumption of knowing the exact external knowledge for adversary. Domingo-Ferrer addressed this issue by proposing 
the “maximum knowledge attacker model”, which considers an adversary who knows the values of all QIDs in the 
confidential dataset about a victim [5]. This model presents the maximum disclosure risk. 
 
Although identity disclosure risk measures have been studied in depth, the literature lacks measuring attribute 
disclosure attacks. In PPDP, various privacy models for attribute disclosure have been proposed. However, they are 
not providing a measurable condition – i.e., they are not measuring the risk of attribute disclosure of a dataset; instead, 
they are specifying a Boolean condition in which the dataset is prevented from attribute disclosure if it satisfies the 
condition [6]. For instance, Machanavajjhala et al. proposed a privacy model named “ℓ-Diversity”, which requires the 
records with similar values in their QIDs have diverse sensitive values [7]. As another privacy model, “t-closeness” 
requires the distribution of sensitive values in each group of records with similar QID values to be close to the overall 
distribution [8].  
      
There are two common drawbacks among privacy techniques in SDC and PPDP. First, they restrict an adversary’s 
knowledge by considering a specific number of attributes as QIDs. However, in real-world applications, many 
adversaries exist with different external knowledge. Addressing this issue, Motwani and Xu proposed distinct ratio 
and separation ratio measures to find QIDs [9]. These measures are defined based on value frequencies in different 
combinations of attribute such that the combinations that lead to more unique values are more likely to form QIDs. 
Secondly, they consider a clear boundary between the set of QIDs and SAs. Nevertheless, in practice, an attribute can 
be a QID and SA simultaneously – e.g., Occupation.  
 
In this paper, we propose a novel record-level disclosure risk measure, which considers both identity and attributes 
disclosure attack concurrently. In addition, it provides flexibility in modeling adversary’s knowledge by assigning 
likelihoods of data attributes being publicly known instead of predefining specific attributes as QIDs, considering any 
combination of attributes being known by an adversary, and allowing QID and SA attributes to have overlap with each 
other. We also provide a mechanism for assigning different sensitivity weights for SAs as well as specific values of 
SAs. This can improve modeling and control of attribute disclosure. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Novel Disclosure Risk Measure 
Our disclosure risk measure is defined at record level, based on risk assessment methodology, where risk of disclosure 
equals likelihood times consequence. Likelihood of a record r indicates the likelihood of it being identified by an 
adversary, and captures identity disclosure attack in risk measurement. Consequence specifies that given r is identified, 
what is the sensitivity of the private information of r being revealed? This term captures attribute disclosure attack. 
 
In calculating risk, we iteratively split attributes into a known set and unknown set of attributes. A known set contains 
attributes, which an adversary knows about a victim (QIDs). The remaining attributes form the unknown set and are 
attributes, which may contain private information (SAs) an adversary wants to disclose about a victim. The unknown 
set is a complement set of the known set. Likelihood is calculated based on the known set and consequence based on 
the unknown set. All subsets of possible known sets and their compliment unknown subsets are considered. Thus, we 
are allowing an attribute to contribute in both known and unknown set and thereby allowing the overlap between QIDs 
and SAs. Since each attribute has 2 possibilities − i.e., being in the known set or in unknown set - given 𝑚 attributes, 
the total number of known-unknown sets is equal to 2𝑚. Our proposed disclosure risk measure is then defined as: 
 
𝐷(𝑟) = ∑ 𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) ×  𝛼 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟)
2𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
(1) 
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where D is the disclosure risk, L is likelihood, C consequence, 𝐾𝑆𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set, 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ unknown set, 
and 𝛼 is a consequence coefficient which is a constant value larger than 1. 
 
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑡) is the likelihood of identifying the record 𝑟 through the attributes in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ known set. It comprises two terms 
− i.e., the probability of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set being publicly known, and the uniqueness of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set’s attribute 
values for the record 𝑟 in the whole dataset. It is formulated as:      
 
𝐿𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) = 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖)  ×  
1
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖))
 
 
(2) 
 
 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) = ∏ 𝑃𝐾(𝐴𝑗)
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝐾𝑆𝑖
 
 
(3) 
 
where 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is the probability of 𝐾𝑆𝑖  being publicly known, 𝐴𝑗 is the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ attribute in 𝐾𝑆𝑖 , 𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖) is 𝐾𝑆𝑖’s attribute 
values for the record 𝑟, and 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡(𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖)) is the number of occurrences of 𝑟(𝐾𝑆𝑖) in the dataset. 
 
The first term in the likelihood expression is the probability of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ known set being publicly known. To make 
calculations tractable, it is assumed that the likelihood of publicly knowing each attribute is independent from one 
another. The probability of 𝐾𝑆𝑖  is then simply the multiplication of the publicly known probabilities of each attribute 
in 𝐾𝑆𝑖 . These probabilities are assigned by data publishers; they have the flexibility to choose probabilities such that 
best considers adversaries' knowledge. 
 
A known set can be very likely to be publicly known but the sets attribute values for a record might occur frequently 
in the dataset. Thus, an adversary will find several matched records for the victim and therefore the identity disclosure 
likelihood is decreased. Hence, the second term considers the values of the known set of attributes for the record 𝑟. 
Then it counts the number of occurrences of those values together in the whole dataset. If this count is large, it means 
a large numbers of records have these values and the person whom record 𝑟 belongs to is less likely to be identified 
by those attributes. Therefore, the count is inversely correlated with likelihood. Including this term, likelihood is no 
longer a probability function. However, for each record it is still a value between 0 and 1. 
 
𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑡) is the consequence of identifying record 𝑟 based on the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ unknown set, which means how much private 
information of record 𝑟 is revealed, after being identified. In order to measure the level of private information of record 
𝑟, which is stored in the unknown set, data publisher needs to assign sensitivity weights to both attributes and their 
values. Accordingly, consequence of record 𝑟 based on the 𝑖𝑡ℎ unknown set is derived as: 
 𝐶𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖(𝑟) =  ∑ 𝑊(𝐴𝑗) × 𝑊 (𝑟(𝐴𝑗))
𝐴𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝐾𝑆𝑖
 
 
(4) 
 
where 𝑟(𝐴𝑗) is the value of 𝐴𝑗 for record 𝑟,  𝑊(𝐴𝑗) is the sensitivity weight of 𝐴𝑗, and 𝑊 (𝑟(𝐴𝑗)) is the sensitivity 
weight of 𝑟(𝐴𝑗). The sensitivity weight implies how much the information is sensitive and private to be disclosed 
about a person. Data publishers have the flexibility to assign weights based on perceived sensitivity of the data. The 
assigned weights are between 0 and 1. 
Table 1. Sample microdata 
 Age Gender Race Income Disease 
𝒓𝟏 34 Male Black 60K Flu 
𝒓𝟐 19 Female White 36K Flu 
𝒓𝟑 40 Male Asian-Pac-Islander 45K Flu 
𝒓𝟒 34 Male Black 50K Cancer 
𝒓𝟓 51 Female Black 65K Flu 
 
As an example, consider a microdata shown in Table 1. We assigned probabilities and sensitivity weights as shown 
in Table 2. Considering one split of attributes {age, gender, race} as the known set and {income, disease} as the 
unknown set, likelihood and consequence for 𝑟4 is calculated as: 
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𝐿{𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟,𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒}(𝑟4) = (0.3 × 0.8 × 0.7 ) × (1 2⁄ ) =  0.084 
𝐶{𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒,𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒}(𝑟4) = (0.9 × 0.7) + (1 × 1) = 1.63 
 
Table 2. Assigned probabilities and sensitivity weights for sample microdata 
Attribute Publicly Known Probability Attribute Sensitivity Weight Value Sensitivity Weight 
Value Weight 
Age 0.3 0 ---------------------- 
Gender 0.8 0 ---------------------- 
Race 0.7 0 ---------------------- 
Income 0.005 0.9 Less than 40K 1 
Between 40K and 70K 0.7 
Disease 0.001 1 Flu 0.2 
Cancer 1 
 
2.2 Calculation Efficiency 
Our proposed disclosure risk measure is calculated over all possible known/unknown sets of attributes – i.e., 2𝑚 
number of sets where 𝑚 is the number of attributes in the dataset. Calculating our risk measure can be computationally 
expensive in datasets with large number of attributes, due to the exponential growth in the number of known/unknown 
sets. To make our risk measure computationally feasible, we reduce the number of known/unknown sets by pruning 
known sets, which lead to low value of likelihood and thereby low contribution in risk measure. If a known subset of 
attributes is highly unlikely to be known, any larger known set containing this subset is even more unlikely, due to the 
product term of probabilities. Thus, if publicly known probability of a known set is less than a threshold ε, any superset 
of that known set will also have the probability of less than ε. Consider a tree of all subsets of known attributes; each 
node represents a subset. The root is the empty subset and at each level of the tree, the size of the subsets grows by 
one. Since 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) of node i monotonically decreases as we traverse the tree from the root to the leaves, by pre-order 
tree traversal, we can prune the subtree at each node with 𝑃𝐾(𝐾𝑆𝑖) less than ε. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Algorithm for creating known sets with publicly known probability of more than ε 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the pruning algorithm, which calculates our proposed disclosure risk measure feasible. In this 
algorithm, we refer to attributes by their indices (1,2,…, m). SUB is a list, which stores the subsets of attributes with 
publicly known probability more than 𝜀 and initially it contains empty subset. Each subset in SUB has a corresponding 
element in NEXT, which shows the remaining attributes that can be appended to that subset. Thus, NEXT is initiated 
by {1,2,…, m} which are attribute indices that can be appended to an empty subset. i is a pointer sweeping SUB and 
NEXT to point to the current subset and select it for checking whether it needs to be enlarged or pruned. After a subset 
is selected, its remaining attributes shown in a corresponding set in NEXT should be appended one by one to the 
Pruning Algorithm  
1. SUB ={{}}; NEXT ={{1,2,3,…,m }}; i=0  // initialization 
2. while ( (length(SUB)-i) ≠ 0 ) {   // loop until no subsets are available for checking their probability 
3.  sub = SUB ( length(SUB)-i );   // select a subset at which the pointer is pointing  
4.  nxt = NEXT ( length(NEXT)-i );  // select the corresponding remaining attributes  
5.  while ( length(nxt) ≠ 0 ) {  // loop until no attributes remained for expanding the current subset  
6.  U = sub ∪ first attribute index in nxt; 
7.  Remove first index in nxt and update nxt; 
8.  NEXT ( length(NEXT)-i ) = nxt; 
9.  if ( product of probabilities of attributes in U ) > 𝜀){ 
10.   Append U to SUB; 
11. Append a set containing indices larger than the maximum index in U  to NEXT; 
12.   Select last set in SUB as sub and last set in NEXT as nxt; 
13.   Reset i to 0;  
14.  }  
15. } 
16. Increment i by one; 
17. } 
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selected subset and each time the probability of the new subset must be checked. If it is more than 𝜀, the new enlarged 
subset is appended to SUB and indices larger than the maximum index in the enlarged subset are appended to NEXT 
as a set. Then i is reset to 0 to start sweeping SUB and NEXT from the end. If not, the new subset is not appended to 
SUB and will not be enlarged. When no more attributes remained for the selected subset, i is incremented by one to 
select the prior subset in SUB and its corresponding remaining attributes in NEXT. 
 
3. Experiment 
We have implemented our approach on a sensitive dataset provided by the Social Research and Evaluation Center at 
Louisiana State University. The dataset contains data from Louisiana Department of Education (LADOE), Office of 
Juvenile Justice (LAOJJ), and Department of Corrections (LADOC). This dataset contains 1009993 students enrolled 
in Louisiana public schools between 1999-2011 school years. There are 1,009,993 records (one record per student), 
and 27 attributes. Examples of attributes are age, gender, ethnicity, homelessness, dropout flag, LADOC contact, and 
LAOJJ contact. This dataset carries valuable information for research purposes in social work domain [10]. 
 
To calculate disclosure risk of each record based on our proposed measure, we need to assign publicly known 
probabilities and sensitivity weights to each attribute, sensitivity weights to the values within each attribute, and 
consequence coefficient (α). The sensitivity weights assigned are either 0 or 1. We set α to be 100 to magnify the 
effect of consequence. Examples of the assigned probabilities and weights for sample attributes are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Examples of assigned publicly known probabilities and sensitivity weights 
Attribute Publicly Known Probability Attribute Sensitivity Weight Value Sensitivity Weight 
Value Weight 
Age 0.05 0 --------- 
Gender 0.8 0 --------- 
Dropout Flag 0.005 1 Yes 1 
No 0 
LADOC Contact Flag 0.001 1 Yes 1 
No 0 
 
Since there are 27 attributes, initially there will be 227 = 134,217,728 known/unknown sets. We employed our 
pruning algorithm to reduce the number of subsets. In this experiment, we assigned the threshold 𝜀 to be 0.01, which 
implies known sets with publicly known probabilities less than 1% are pruned. After applying our proposed pruning 
algorithm, only 111 subsets of attributes remained. Thus, we calculated the disclosure risk of each record based on 
our proposed measure over 111 known and unknown sets. Having all parameters being specified, we have calculated 
the disclosure risk measure for each record in the dataset and the histogram of risk values among 1,009,993 records is 
shown in Figure 2. It is illustrated that 15,651 records (1.55%) have risk value more than 0.01. To further decrease 
this number of high risk records, we can apply anonymization only on the high risk records and decrease their 
disclosure risk [11]. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Studying privacy disclosure risk measures in the literature, no single metric has been proposed to measure the risk of 
both identity and attribute disclosure attack at the same time. We have formulated both types of disclosure in a single 
combined metric, which can be measured for each record in a dataset. Our proposed disclosure risk measure is 
calculated based on the parameters, which are assigned by a data publisher according to the nature of the dataset. Data 
publisher needs to determine the probability of being publicly known for each attribute and the sensitivity level of 
each attribute and each value within an attribute in terms of containing private information. These parameters improve 
modeling disclosure attacks, compared to the previous works in literature where data publishers need to strictly 
determine specific number of QIDs and SAs, with no overlap. In addition, we are modeling adversaries with any 
possible background knowledge by considering any combination of attributes to be known by adversary, contrary to 
previous works where they restrict adversaries’ knowledge. In order to make the calculation of our risk measure 
feasible for datasets with large number of attributes, we have developed a pruning algorithm and evaluated the 
feasibility of our approach through an experiment on real-world sensitive dataset.  
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Figure 2. Histogram of Records Disclosure Risk Values (Logarithmic Scale) 
 
Besides the usability of our measure in privacy disclosure risk assessment, it can be useful for improving privacy 
preserving data publishing techniques. These techniques can be optimized and better preserve data utility if they get 
modified to target records with high disclosure risk.  
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